Saturday, February 20, 2010

Free will

I was reading a message board debate -- the kind wherein some people argue intelligently, and some argue as though they were philosophical dilletantes. In this discussion, somebody brought up the concept of free will. His opponent retorted, "You're only allowed to cite free will if you can resolve all the problems with it" and proceeded to cite some alleged problems.

First of all, I don't think that the problems he raised are truly problems at all. For example, he claimed that it's poorly defined; after all, what are we free of? I think that's a childish objection. We intuitively know what free will is -- it is the ability to make our own moral decisions. One might quibble about certain philosophical fine points, but ultimately, it means that we are not simply slaves to the universe and that our every action is not predetermined by the laws of physics.

Moreover, even if the issues he raised were truly problematic, what of it? Are we truly not allowed to mention free will in a debate unless we can resolve all of its philosophical problems? That would be like saying that a scientist can only cite quantum mechanics if he can resolve all of the problems with its implications. It's a foolish line of reasoning. One need not resolve every single problem with a premise or line of thought before it can be used.

Moreover, denying the existence of free will creates its own host of problems. Consider this: if there is no free will, then whatever "reasons" you have for rejecting it are ultimately not reasons of your own choosing. You may be right in rejecting it, but only as a matter of dumb luck, the same way that a stopped clock is right twice in one day. It also makes it nonsensical for someone to criticize a person who believes in free will, as that person ultimately has no choice but to believe it. If you insist in only using premises that are problem-free, then you can neither presume free will nor adopt a position of non-belief. It's a daft and self-defeating line of reasoning.